STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Suit (A.35) was brought against me in the
294th district court of Van Zandt County by attorney G. David Westfall
("Westfall") in behalf of a "The
Law Offices of G. David Westfall, P.C.", claiming an unpaid OPEN
ACCOUNT for LEGAL FEES . There of course never was an open account, not
with a $20,000 NON-REFUNDABLE prepayment "for the purpose of insuring
our [lawyer's] availability", and the lawyer reserving the "right
to terminate" for
"your [Birnbaum] non-payment
of fees or costs". (See attorney "retainer agreement", at end of
this Petition)
What had first brought me into the 294th
District Court was when I was sued in 1995 over a BEAVER DAM[1]. The $20,000 prepayment had been for suing
then 294th district judge Tommy Wallace and other state
judges in the Dallas Federal Court[2]
for racketeering (18 U.S.C. $ 1964(c) "civil RICO") regarding
their beaver dam scheme. Then long after
I terminated him, Westfall brought this supposed "open account" case, claiming I owed
him an additional $18,121.00.
I, Udo
Birnbaum, asserted defenses of FRAUD, and counter-claimed under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), and made cross and third party claims
under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
("civil RICO") against three (3) persons associated with the
"Law Office" (G. David Westfall, Christina Westfall, and Stefani
[Westfall] Podvin, "The Westfalls"), and asked for trial by jury
(CR.18, CR.77, CR.92, CR.100). Birnbaum
also moved for appointment of an auditor per RCP Rule 172 to investigate and
report on the alleged OPEN ACCOUNT.
(CR.65, CR.67)
The trial
judge DENIED (A.96) my motion for an auditor, ruled summary judgment
(A.97) on my civil RICO claim, DENIED my DTPA jury question of no-worth (judges are immune from
suit!), DENIED my jury question of excused
(A.38, A.40) because the lawyer had not done what he had promised[3].
Then, THREE
months AFTER the trial, Judge Banner comes back again to weigh my civil
RICO evidence (I of course had asked for weighing by JURY), and FINES me
$62,000 (A.18) for having made such claim TWO years earlier (having long ago
granted summary judgment on it), stating (A.20) that I may have been
"well-intentioned", just that he
did not see a civil RICO case:
"Mr. Birnbaum may be well-intentioned
and may believe that he had some
kind of real claim as far as RICO there was
nothing presented to the court in any of the proceedings since I've been
involved that suggest he had any
basis in law or in fact to support his [civil RICO] suits against the
individuals[4]".
(all completed
acts, making the sanction purely punitive, not "coercive") Sanctions hearing
Misstatements
by the Court of Appeals
The Opinion
INCORRECTLY stated virtually ALL procedural facts, and especially as
they relate to my PRESERVING my points of error for appellate
review. As examples of the erroneous
nature of the Opinion (A.2), I present the following, taken directly out of
my Petition
for Rehearing En Banc (DENIED):
·
"Birnbaum appeals a jury
verdict and judgment"? I am not
appealing on the answers by the jury[5],
but on a judgment that does not conform to the pleadings and the verdict (and
due process).
·
"Birnbaum also appeals orders
on motions for [ ] sanctions"? This is not
an "order" (to "coerce") at all, but unlawful
punishment[6]
("THIS JUDGMENT RENDERED", A.18) for having made a "civil
RICO" pleading! (A.20)
Background
·
"There is no order
on Birnbaum's motion to appoint an auditor in the clerk's record". ERRONEOUS. See Pretrial Order (A.96)
·
"a jury made
affirmative findings … … for breach of contract"? The jury did NOT
find on all the elements of a breach of contract. (
·
"Third Party defendants
filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 13"? $62,000 sanctions for legal fees of
the entire proceeding is of course not
permitted under RCP Rule 13, only fees relating to abuse of
discovery, of which there was none
on my part. (only RCP Rule 215-2b sanctions available under Rule 13)[8]
. Judge Banner even found that I was "well-intentioned" (A.20), only
that he did not see the evidence as showing my civil RICO case. I of course had
asked for determination by JURY.
Judgment
·
"Because Birnbaum filed
only a partial reporter's record … … we are unable to review
these complaints [if the judgment conforms to the
pleadings and the verdict]?
ERRONEOUS. All that is needed is the pleadings (A.35), the verdict
(A.41), and the judgment (A.11), and they were all in the Clerk's Record and the Civil Appendix! That is all that counts in a jury trial!
·
"court could not
determine whether giving improper jury instructions was harmful
error"? ERRONEOUS. My appeals issue is improper jury questions! (A.38, A.40)
·
"nothing preserved for
review on issue whether judgment conformed to pleadings, because complaint
could not be raised for first time on
appeal"? ERRONEOUS. My Brief is full of evidence of my
OBJECTING in the trial court, a detailed chronology of Law Office proposed jury
issues and my objections, even copying them into my Appeal Brief, even
providing a copy of my Objections (A.38) and again LAST
MINUTE handwritten OBJECTIONS (A.40) and including them in the Clerk's
Record and the Civil Appendix!
·
"complaint could not be
raised for the first time on appeal"? ERRONEOUS.
Was raised in my Rule 276 Request For Endorsement By The
Court of "Refusals" and "Modifications" (A.46). Raised in my Motion to reconsider the $59,000
judgment. Raised in my Request for Findings (A.27). Raised
in my Notice of Overdue Findings (A.32). NO RESPONSE. Again raised in my Motion (A.34) in the
Appointment of
Auditor
·
"While Birnbaum did
file a motion to appoint an auditor with the trial court, he did not receive
a ruling on the motion. Therefore, he did not preserve his complaint
for appeal"? ERRONEOUS.
See Pretrial Order (A.96). I
moved to appoint an Auditor. I put in a supplement thereto. I requested hearings thereon. At every
hearing, I presented the trial judge with a three-ring notebook with all the
un-addressed motions, with a summary list on the cover. I moved for recusal for
not appointing auditor. I sought mandamus
(A.100) to make trial judge appoint auditor (denied). But it was not till his PRETRIAL
Order (A.96) that Judge Banner formally denied my motion[9].
·
Despite my claim of fraud, racketeering, obstruction
of discovery, affidavits by numerous persons regarding the fraud,
and my right to a court-appointed auditor under RCP Rule 172, this trial judge
would not do so. If there ever was a case that required an auditor, this case
was it! Also see my Summary Judgment Appendix (A.72)
Summary
Judgment
·
"We review a no-evidence
summary judgment … [for] more than a scintilla"? I provided the trial judge with hours of
depositions, and documents showing that Law Office did not even have an
accounting system, VOLUMES and VOLUMES of court transcripts, court findings
of "bad faith" on G. David Westfall, numerous person's
affidavits regarding Westfall's fraud, etc.[10]
See my Summary Judgment Appendix (A.72)
·
"Birnbaum filed
affidavits of several unhappy clients of Law Office"? This evidence, looked at "in light most
favorable", of course showed G. David Westfall's "pattern of
racketeering activity", as did the transcript of G. David Westfall's
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, as did various courts' and the State Bar's
finding of "bad faith".
·
"Although Birnbaum also
referred to deposition testimony … …
this evidence was not submitted to
the trial court"? ERRONEOUS. At
summary judgment, Judge Banner ruled that each and every document I had
did not show a civil RICO case, and denied each and every bit of my civil
RICO evidence, and my civil RICO claim.
See Pretrial Order (A.95) and Order Sustaining Motions for Summary
Judgment (A.97).
·
"He [Birnbaum] does
not, however, offer summary judgment evidence regarding how mailing this fraudulent
bill constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity, or furthers a
recognizable scheme formed with specific intent to defraud"? How can there be fraud, without
intent to defraud?
·
I had asked for trial by jury on my civil RICO cause and
evidence, in a trial court, of course, not before the appeals panel.
Sanctions
Order
·
"We agree with Birnbaum
that the trial court's order awards sanctions without stating the basis
for the award, and therefore does not meet the requirements of rule 13. THAT MAKES IT UNLAWFUL. PERIOD.
·
"This error, however,
may be waived". "Waived" means knowingly
giving up a right. Why would I knowingly
give up a right about an unlawful sanction against me. NONSENSE.
·
And what about my point that it is UNLAWFUL, because it is unconditional punishment, for a completed act[11],
(i.e. not "coercive"), imposed without full due criminal process? SILENCE!
·
"Birnbaum did not bring
either of his complaints about the sanctions order to the attention of the
trial judge"? ERRONEOUS. See my Request
for Findings (A.27), Notice of Past Due Findings (A.32),
etc.
·
"he [Birnbaum] did not
object to the specificity of the order or to the criminal nature
of the sanctions"? ERRONEOUS. See my Request
for Findings (A.27), Notice of Past Due Findings A.32),
etc.
·
"Birnbaum's only
complaint about the specificity of the order was made in an untimely
request for findings of fact"?
ERRONEOUS. The trial judge put "Aug. 9" on his Order
on Motions for Sanctions (A.18), but did not "sign with the clerk", or let anybody know that
he had "signed" it, till Aug. 21, and I first got notice of it on
Aug. 22, 2002. My Request for Findings
(A.27) filed
·
"Therefore, the trial
judge did not have the opportunity to correct the erroneous order"? What about my Notice of Past Due Findings
(A.32), even my Motion to have the Trial Judge Produce Finding (A.34) before
this very same panel? (Copy was
provided to Judge Banner)
Fraud
·
"he [Birnbaum] contends
he made no agreements with Law Office" ? I made no such statement in by Brief. I stated that our attorney retainer agreement
(attached at end of this Petition) was neither "open account" nor
"contract", only a prepaid $20,000 "to insure our [Westfall] availability in your matter",
and that he [Westfall] "reserved the right to terminate"
for NON-PAYMENT. That was his ONLY remedy. Besides he had long
ago broken the agreement. FRAUD, FRAUD,
FRAUD
·
"The issue regarding
any contractual relationship between Birnbaum and Law Office was resolved by
jury"? The jury was not asked the due
process questions, i.e. whether there had been an agreement,
whether it still existed, i.e. whether Westfall had abided by the
agreement (not to incur large expenses without my approval, the
"excused" issue). See Court's Charge (A.41) and my
objections (A.38) and (A.40).
·
"Therefore, we presume
the omitted portions of the record support the trial court's judgment"?
This was of course a jury trial, and I
am not attacking the sufficiency of the evidence for the jury verdict.
Only that the VERDICT does not support the trial court's JUDGMENT.
Due Process
·
"complains of the same
rulings addressed in other parts of his brief"? My Appeals
Brief refers to my Motion for New Trial (CR.444, CR.459, excruciatingly detailed,
with affidavits and exhibits), with seven (7) specific Points, among them:
Point 7, "For
jury misconduct by the judge himself", for going into the jury room
for long periods, even during deliberations.
There was no bailiff or other court personnel.
Point 4, "For
allowing Plaintiff to submit 'surprise' jury issues not in its
pleadings"? (handed them
to me, last day of trial, just before Argument. I of course objected,
even in hand-writing, and immediately filed, but to no avail)
·
"The issue presents
nothing for review"? How about the trial judge
allowing surprise jury issues not in the pleadings, and jury misconduct
by the trial judge himself by mixing with the jury in the jury room, and
the whapping $62,000[12]
"sanction judgment" for having made a civil RICO pleading[13].
And how about TWO (2)
judgments, in the same cause[14]?
SUMMARY OF
THE ARGUMENT
As shown above, the Appeals Court is
using a clearly ERRONEOUS version of the PROCEDURAL background of the
entire case to find that I had somehow not "preserved" and/or
"waived" my issues. But what they are saying has NO SUPPORT IN THE
RECORD!
But
even more than that, the important issues they did NOT address were those I put
into my Petition for Rehearing En Banc (DENIED), namely:
·
Whether the Panel's Opinion is devoid of Constitutional considerations
·
Whether the Panel micro-procedurally upholds a patently unlawful $62,000
punitive sanction for having made a civil RICO (civil racketeering)
pleading
·
Whether the Panel micro-procedurally upholds a $59,000 judgment that
does not conform to the pleadings and the verdict.
The evil nature of this whole case is most
clearly seen through the prism of the $62,255.00 sanction (A.18) imposed, three
months after the entry of judgment (A.11), such "sanction" for
filing, two years earlier, civil RICO claims, as a defendant! Without ever being disobedient to
anything[15],
without ever any warning by the judge, without any lesser sanctions
ever imposed, without the judge ever making a finding of bad faith,
and in fact finding just the opposite at the close of the sanction
hearing
[16]:
"In assessing the
sanctions, the Court has taken into consideration that although Mr. Birnbaum
may be well-intentioned and may believe that he had some kind of real
claim as far as RICO there was nothing presented to the court in any of the
proceedings since I've been involved that suggest he had any basis in
law or in fact to support his suits against the individuals, and I
think -- can find that such sanctions as I've determined are appropriate." Sanctions hearing (A.20)
The Fifth
Court of Appeals precedent of upholding the assessment of a FINE of $62,000 (or
ANY fine), merely because the evidence (I had asked for trial by JURY!)
did NOT convince a judge of a person's claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) "civil RICO", defeats
the stated purpose of the [civil RICO] statute:
"[a] Congressional
objective [in enacting civil RICO with treble damages] of encouraging civil
litigation not merely to compensate victims but also to turn them into private attorneys general,
supplementing Government efforts by undertaking
litigation in the public good. Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549
(2000)
The Fifth
Court of Appeals also sets a dangerous precedent of punishment for speaking out
in a Texas court of law. (RAP Rule 56.1(a)(4) "constitutional issue")
The Fifth
Court of Appeals made an "error of law of such importance to the state's
jurisprudence that it should be corrected". RAP Rule 56.1(a)(5)
ARGUMENT
1. THE $59,280.66 JUDGMENT[17]
(A.11) IS UNLAWFUL
It does not
conform to the pleadings and the verdict.
The jury answers are irrelevant. (Details in Motion to Reconsider the $59,280.66 Judgment)
There was no finding by the jury
regarding Plaintiff's claim[18] of the state of the
accounts, i.e. how much is owed:
The elements of
an action on account are: (1) that there was a sale and delivery,
(2) that the amount alleged on the account is just, i.e., the prices charged
are consistent with an agreement, or in the absence of agreement, are usual,
customary and reasonable prices for the things sold and delivered;
and (3) that the amount alleged is unpaid. See Maintain, Inc. v.
Maxson-Mahoney-Turner, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Milligan v. R&S Mechanical, NO.
05-87-01341-CV, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas, Aug. 11, 1998.
There certainly was no finding[19] by the jury of a
"sale" and "delivery", and Birnbaum certainly raised the
jury issue that all of plaintiff's "legal goods" (of suing judges)
had no
worth
[20],
for judges in their judicial capacity are absolutely immune from suit! (My DENIED DTPA jury issue)
And in light of plaintiff's requested jury issues in the nature of
a breach of contract, Birnbaum even submitted the jury issue of being excused
(A.38, A.40) by reason of plaintiff's prior failure to live up to the
agreement, i.e. to bill monthly, and not to obligate to large expenses without
prior approval (Attorney retainer agreement, end of this Petion). Plaintiff
certainly did not get a jury finding (A.41) that it had abided by the contract
by systematically and honestly billing monthly. The purpose of "systematic
billing", of course, is to keep someone from suddenly coming up with a
humongous $18,121.10 surprise owed
"bill" as plaintiff did.
At
issue in this cause was the existence of the account, i.e. how much
money was owed , not
"damages" under some other theory.
RCP Rule 301 states: "The judgment of the court shall conform
to the pleadings, the nature of the case proved and the verdict, etc.
" Staring at each other are two
diametrically opposed verified pleadings as to the state of the accounts, i.e.
how much is owed, with no report by an auditor, and no finding by the jury of the state of the accounts.[21]
2. DEFENDANT
BIRNBAUM HAD A RIGHT
TO A
COURT-APPOINTED AUDITOR
Due process
demanded an auditor per RCP Rule 172 to address the issue of fraud
(Details in
Motion
for Appointment of Auditor Pursuant to Rule 172 RCP)
[22]
At issue
was Plaintiff's claim of the state of
the accounts. Due process
demanded[23] the
appointment of an auditor, not only in light of the diametrically opposite
verified pleadings staring at each other, but also in light of Birnbaum's
complaint of fraud, racketeering, deceptive trade practices,
and obstruction of discovery.
3. THE "RICO Relief" SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
IS ALSO
UNLAWFUL
I have the
Right to show my best defense, claim, and evidence. The Rules and the law do
not allow a judge to weigh the evidence to grant summary judgment on
civil RICO claims.
Granting the Westfalls "Rico relief",
as the judge termed it
[24],
denied Birnbaum his Right to show his best claim and evidence.
"Any
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) "civil RICO"
Birnbaum
had a statutory right to show the jury G. David Westfall's prior
"pattern of racketeering activity", to show that this very suit
against me was just another "predicate act" that in that
pattern.
Civil RICO of course does not have
"elements" in a tort case sense, only "issues of fact". And
as shown in my responses[25],
summary judgment is not even
available under civil RICO:
"Material
issues of genuine fact existed with respect to existence of an enterprise
as defined by this chapter, association of defendant printing company with such
enterprise, association of the alleged enterprise with organized criminal
activity, the intent and knowledge of defendant concerning the underlying
predicate acts and the existence of injury caused by alleged violation of this
chapter, precluding summary judgment
in favor of defendant in action alleging the kickback scheme. Estee
Lauder, Inc. v. Harco Graphics, Inc., D.C.N.Y.1983, 558 F.Supp.83.
4. THE $62,255.00 "SANCTION"
JUDGMENT
[26]
IS ALSO UNLAWFUL
The sanction
is CRIMINAL in nature, for it is for a COMPLETED act
(for making a
civil RICO defense and claim TWO years ago)
This
sanction is patently UNLAWFUL because it is not a civil sanction at all,
but a CRIMINAL sanction, imposed on me without full due criminal process,
including a finding beyond a reasonable doubt:
Whether a contempt is civil
or criminal turns on the "character and purpose" of the
sanction involved. Thus, a contempt sanction is considered civil
if it "is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if
it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate
the authority of the court. U.S.
Supreme Court in United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994)
The distinction between civil and criminal
contempt has been explained as follows: The purpose of civil contempt is
remedial and coercive
in nature. A judgment of civil contempt exerts the judicial authority of
the court to persuade the contemnor to obey some order of the
court where such obedience will benefit an opposing litigant. Imprisonment is conditional upon obedience
and therefore the civil contemnor carries the keys of (his) prison in
(his) own pocket. In other words, it is civil contempt when one may procure
his release by compliance with the provisions of the order of the court.
Criminal contempt on the other hand
is punitive in nature. The sentence is not conditioned upon some promise
of future performance because the contemnor is being punished for some completed
act which affronted
the dignity and authority of the court.
The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, No. 73,986 (June 5, 2002)
So what had I done? There was never
a warning. The sanction Order does not even hint at wrongs
(details below). RCP Rule 13 of course prohibits sanctions "except for good cause, the particulars
of which must be stated in
the sanction order". The only
clue comes from the transcript of the sanctions hearing[27] at which the trial judge certainly made no finding of "bad faith":
"In assessing the sanctions, the Court has taken into
consideration that although Mr. Birnbaum may be well-intentioned and may believe that he had some kind of real claim as
far as RICO there was
nothing presented to the court in any of the proceedings since I've been
involved that suggest he had any
basis in law or in fact to support his suits against the individuals, and I
think -- can find that such sanctions as I've determined are appropriate."
The answer is that I was sanctioned
because I "had"
made a civil RICO counterclaim in the case TWO years ago, a long ago completed act, that somehow now
suddenly "affronted"
the judge, making the sanction a CRIMINAL sanction, imposed on me without full
criminal process. (Note: They file
counterclaims all the time, but not civil RICO. I was the first.)
I had asked for trial by JURY, and the
trial judge was no more entitled to weigh the evidence to make a finding
that there was no RICO violation, and sanction me, than he was entitled to find that there was a
RICO violation, and throw the Westfalls
in jail.
6. FRAUD,
FRAUD, AND MORE FRAUD
Plaintiff's
Original Petition[28]
claimed an OPEN ACCOUNT. The attorney RETAINER
agreement
[29],
however, gives the remedy, the ONLY remedy the lawyer had, "We reserve the
right to terminate our attorney-client
relationship for … … Your non-payment
of fees or costs." It was NOT an open
account at all!
There was no SALE and DELIVERY![30]
And submitting a jury question that PRE-SUPPOSES a BREACH OF CONTRACT?
[31]
(There was no contract, only a PREPAID RETAINER!) FRAUD, FRAUD, and MORE FRAUD, and the judge
would not appoint an auditor!
7. DUE
PROCESS DEMANDS A NEW TRIAL
This appeals point is fully addressed in my
Motion
for New Trial
[32],
and Supplement
to Motion for New Trial
[33].
The trial judge did not respond to
this motion, nor my Motion to Reconsider the $59,280.66 Judgment
[34],
nor my Rule 276 Request for Endorsement by the Court of "Refusals"
and "Modifications
[35]"
(re jury instructions, questions, and definitions), nor my Motion to Reconsider the
$62,255.00 "frivolous lawsuit" Sanction
[36],
nor my Request for Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
[37],
nor my Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
[38]
regarding the trial judge sanctioning me $62,255.00 for having raised a civil
RICO cross and third party claim.(i.e. the judge himself making a finding on
the "frivolous" vs. "bona-fide racketeering" issue, an
issue I had asked to be determined by jury.)
CONCLUSION
The
following from my Notice Of Past Due Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law[39]:
The judge had a jury sitting there, BUT HE DID
NOT USE IT!
"Your Honor, please let the record know what findings
of fact, and conclusions of law you made to come
up with the two judgments you
awarded against me in this case:
PRAYER
The Appeals Court's Opinion is a
micro-procedural analysis devoid of Constitutional considerations. Nowhere does the Panel address my key
point that assessing a punitive sanction for having made a civil RICO
pleading actually violates the LAW.[40]
Upholding
the assessment of a FINE of $62,000 (or ANY fine), merely because the
evidence did NOT prove a person's claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) "civil RICO", defeats the stated purpose of
the [civil RICO] statute:
"[a] Congressional objective [in enacting civil RICO with treble
damages] of encouraging civil litigation not merely to compensate victims but
also to turn them into private
attorneys general, supplementing Government efforts by undertaking litigation in the public
good". Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549 (2000)
It also
sets a precedent of punishment for speaking out in a Texas court of law, and is
an error of law of such importance to the state's jurisprudence that it should
be corrected. RAP Rule 56.1(a)(5)
__________________
Udo Birnbaum, pro se
540 VZ CR 2916
Eustace, Texas 75124
(903) 479-3929 phone and fax
Certificate
of Service
This
is to certify that on this the __22____ day of January, 2004 a copy of this
document, together with the referenced Civil Appendix, was sent by regular mail
to attorney Frank C. Fleming at PMB 305, 6611 Hillcrest Ave., Dallas Texas
75205-1301. I further certify that all
the documents in the Appendix to this Petition are true copies of the
originals.
___________________
Udo Birnbaum
[1] William B. Jones v. Udo Birnbaum, No. 95-63, 294th District Court of Van Zandt County, 1995. Case still active.
[2] Udo Birnbaum v. Richard L. Ray, et al, No. 3:99-CV-0696-R, Dallas Federal Court, 1999.
[3] I asked for the excused issue to the jury when the lawyer framed his jury issues as a breach of contract, which he of course had not even pleaded!)
[4] My civil RICO suit had been against "the individuals", and "the individuals" ONLY, not against "Law Office".
[5] Except to the extent that the jury was not presented with the correct ("due process") jury questions
[6] "It was, however, clearly established that filing a lawsuit was constitutionally protected conduct. See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2 d 371, 37 3-74 (3d C ir. 1981); see also California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (access to courts is one aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government for grievances). Moreover, it was also clearly established that the government cannot retaliate against someone for engaging in constitutionally protected activity in a way that would chill a reasonable person in the exercise of the constitutional right. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois.", 497 U.S. 62, 73 , 76 n.8 (1990).
[7] QUESTION 1: What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate the Law Offices of G. David Westfall, P.C., for its damages, if any, that resulted from Defendant, Udo Birnbaum's failure to comply with the agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant?
[8] The ONLY Rule 13 monetary sanction available is under RCP 215-2b(7): "In lieu of any of the forgoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him, or both, to pay, at such time as ordered by the court, the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Such an order shall be subject to review on appeal from the final judgment. THERE WAS NO UNDERLYING ORDER!
[9] Pretrial Order, Nov. 13, 2002. "motion
for appointment of Auditor is in all things denied."
[10] The trial judge ruled on all of it, and ruled it did not show a "civil RICO" case, and granted summary judgment. See Pretrial Order (A.96)
[11] "The distinction between civil and criminal contempt has been explained as follows: The purpose of civil contempt is remedial and coercive in nature. A judgment of civil contempt exerts the judicial authority of the court to persuade the contemnor to obey some order of the court where such obedience will benefit an opposing litigant. Imprisonment is conditional upon obedience and therefore the civil contemnor carries the keys of (his) prison in (his) own pocket. In other words, it is civil contempt when one may procure his release by compliance with the provisions of the order of the court.
Criminal contempt on the other hand is punitive in nature. The sentence is not conditioned upon some promise of future performance because the contemnor is being punished for some completed act which affronted the dignity and authority of the court." The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, No. 73,986 (June 5, 2002)
[12] A trial court must first consider and impose less stringent sanctions to determine whether lesser sanctions will promote compliance and discourage further abuse. Jones v. Andrews, 873 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, no writ). As quoted in Rawles v. Builders Structural Services, Texas 5th No. 05-96-00467-cv
[13] Rule 13 requires the trial court to examine the acts or omissions of a party or counsel, not the legal merit of a party's pleadings. See id.; McCain, 856 S.W.2d at 757. As quoted in Rawles v. Builders Structural Services, Texas 5th No. 05-96-00467-cv
[14] RCP Rule 301. Judgments. "THE JUDGMENT of the court shall conform, etc." The "Order on Motions for Sanctions" states : THIS JUDGMENT RENDERED ON JULY 30, 2002, AND SIGNED THIS 9TH day of August, 2002. (Not actually "signed with the clerk" till August 21, 2002. I received NO KNOWLEDGE of it till August 22, 2002. My Request for Findings and Conclusions WAS TIMELY, as was my Notice of Past Due Findings and Conclusions.
[15] The judge never previously chastised or warned me, and issued no order I could have disobeyed. In fact he Ordered depositions!
[16] Transcript of close of 7-30-02 "frivolous lawsuit" sanction hearing (A.20, paragraph 2)
[17] Appendix 11, CR.421
[18]
Plaintiff's petitions (A.35) Also see CR.16, CR.229
[19] Court's Charge (A.41, CR.345) Question 1, "What amount of money, etc." Not conditioned on ANYTHING!
[20] (Record 321) bottom of page, instruction regarding WORTH, PJC 102.2 Texas Pattern Jury Charges. "False, misleading, or deceptive" to include "representing that services would have worth that they did not have."
[21] The question to the jury was "What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate The Law Offices of G. David Westfall, P.C., for its damages, if any, that resulted from the Defendant, Udo Birnbaum's failure to comply with the agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant?" But Plaintiff did not plead breach of contract, and certainly did not prove all the elements, including that it had previously not breached the agreement.
[22] Motion for Appointment of Auditor Pursuant to Rule 172 RCP 12-19-00 (CR.65, CR.67)
[23] "When an investigation of accounts or examination of vouchers appears necessary for the purpose of justice between the parties to any suit, the court shall appoint an auditor or auditors to state the accounts between the parties and to make report thereof to the court as soon as possible. The auditor shall verify his report by his affidavit stating that he has carefully examined the state of the account between the parties, and that his report contains a true statement thereof, so far as the same has come within his knowledge, etc." RCP Rule 172, (emphasis added)
[24] Order Sustaining Motions For Summary
Judgment (A.97) The civil RICO claim
was not against the "Law Office", but against "The
Westfalls" for using "The Law Office" as their
"enterprise"
[25] Summary Judgment Motions, Responses, Replies, Clerk's Record 115, 117, 123, 129, 143, 165, 189, 213, 238, 242, 249, 256
[26] Order on Motions for Sanctions, (A.18, CR.432)
[27]
Transcript of 7-30-02 "frivolous lawsuit" sanction hearing. (A.20,
"page 7" lines 5 through 12)
[28] Plaintiff's Original Petition 9-21-00 (CR.16) First Amended Original Petition 9-5-01 (A.35, CR.229) Identical
[29] Retainer Agreement 5-5-99, attached AT END of this Petition
[30] See Issue 1, case law near beginning
[31] Court's Charge question 1: "What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate the Law Offices of G. David Westfall, P.C., for its damages, if any, that resulted from Defendant, Udo Birnbaum's failure to comply with the agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant?" (Record 345, 348) Question pre-supposes a breach of contract!
[32] Motion for New Trial 8-28-02 (CR.444)
[33] Supplement To Motion For New Trial 8-29-02 (CR.459)
[34] Motion to Reconsider the $59,280.66 Judgment 8-19-02 (CR.438)
[35] Rule 276 Request for Endorsement by the Court of "Refusals" and "Modifications" 8-19-02 (Record 434)
[36] Motion to Reconsider the $62,255 "frivolous lawsuit" Sanction 8-19-02 (CR.441)
[37] Request for Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 9-3-02 (CR.461)
[38] Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 10-1-02 (CR.492)
[39] Clerk's Record (CR.492)
[40] "It was, however, clearly established that filing a lawsuit was constitutionally protected conduct. See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2 d 371, 37 3-74 (3d C ir. 1981); see also California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (access to courts is one aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government for grievances). Moreover, it was also clearly established that the government cannot retaliate against someone for engaging in constitutionally protected activity in a way that would chill a reasonable person in the exercise of the constitutional right. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois.", 497 U.S. 62, 73 , 76 n.8 (1990).